

IV. A. 5.

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

ORIGINS OF THE INSURGENCY

1954 - 1960

#279



# UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

## 1945 - 1967

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## IV. A. 6.

FOOTNOTES

1. Public Statement of President Eisenhower of 21 July 1954 (White House Press Release that date; of Under Secretary Smith in Richard P. Stebbins, et.al., The United States in World Affairs, 1954, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 255.

The Administration was severely criticized in public. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, while the conference was in session on the eve of Dien Bien Phu's fall, asserted that: "American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal...We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world." New York Times, May 7, 1954. Anthony Eden, Toward Peace in Indochina, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), ix-13. The Administration analysis of public record is in Secretary Dulles, Department of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954. For "inner councils" see OCB, "Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," NSC 5405, August 6, 1954; TS; and, NSC, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5429, August 4, 1954) TS.

2. U.S. Department of State telegrams,

DULFE 187 from Geneva, 16 June 1954 (TS)  
 SECTO 553 from Geneva, 2 July 1954 (TS)  
 Dillon 32 from Paris, 2 July 1954 (TS)  
 SECTO 632 from Geneva, 17 July 1954 (TS)  
 SECTO 638 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)  
 SECTO 645 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)

Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La Fin d'Une Guerre: Indochina 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), 234-236, 238-239, 265.

3. Statement of Tran Van Do in George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, ed., The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta, 1966), 374. U.S. Department of State, telegrams, No. 2757 from Paris, April 29, 1954; SECTO 654 and 655 from Geneva, 18 July 1954; and SECTO 673 from Geneva, 19 July 1954. "Ngo Dinh Diem on Elections in Vietnam," (July 16, 1955) in Marvin E. Gattelman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 193-194.

4. "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print, 3d Revised Edition (Washington: GPO, July, 1967), 50-62.

5. Ibid., 53.
6. "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," Ibid., 81.
7. Department of State telegrams SECTO 632 and 645 of 17 and 18 July, 1954, respectively.
8. P. J. Honey quotes Pham's remarks to this effect to a Vietnamese friend of Honey's, in Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1963), 6. Also, U.S. Department of State, "Viet Minh Reactions to Indochina Settlement," (Intelligence Brief, 5 August 1954), C, in U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction and Support of the War in South Vietnam" (DIAAP-4, May, 1967) S, Draft, Supporting Documents, Vol. 1, No. 15; and Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 137-138. N. B., Ellen Hammer quotes Pham Van Dong to exactly the opposite: "Make no mistake, those elections will be held." Ellen T. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 344.
9. Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh On Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 272.
10. Donald Lancaster, "Power Politics at the Geneva Conference 1954," in Gettleman, ed., Viet Nam, op. cit., 134; Department of State telegram SECTO 633 from Geneva, July 17, 1954, S.
11. U.S. Department of State, "Verbatim Minutes of Geneva Conference," 21 July 1954, VerbMin/8, 347-348.
12. The French National Assembly ratified on 4 June 1954 two treaties, one providing for independence for Vietnam, the other for Vietnam's association as an equal with France in the French Union. The latter permitted Vietnam to determine subsequently the extent of association. The former recognized Vietnam "as a fully independent and sovereign State invested with all the competence recognized by international law." Vietnam agreed to assume France's part "in all the rights and obligations resulting from international treaties or conventions contracted by France on behalf or on account of the State of Vietnam or of any other treaties or conventions concluded by France on behalf of French Indochina insofar as those acts concern Vietnam." U.S. Department of State, Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference, VerbMin/3 (May 12, 1954), 99-101. Department of State telegram, Dulles to Paris, 4398, June 4, 1955, (TS).
13. E.g., George T. McT. Kahin, "Excerpts from National Teach-In on Viet Nam policy," in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, ed., The Viet Nam Reader (New York: Vintage, 1965), 291; also, Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op. cit., 56-57.

14. CF. U.S. Department of Defense Memorandum for Mr. Haydn Williams, from the Office of the General Counsel, "The Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Introduction of U.S. Combat and Logistic Forces into Vietnam" (26 October 1961) TS, which holds that: "Vietnam, although not a signatory to the cease-fire Agreement in question is, on the other hand, bound by its terms"; and, U.S. Department of State, "Legal Basis for U.S. Military Aid to South Vietnam," Vietnam Information Notes No. 10 (August 1967), which holds differently. Also, John Norton Moore, "The lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1967), 2-4; and Honey, op. cit., 40-41.
15. U.S. Department of State, telegram, Dillon 5035 from Paris, June 24, 1954, TS; B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 176-177; Moore, op. cit., 3 (n.7).
16. Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for Unification of Vietnam," in Gettleman, ed., Vietnam, op. cit., 217-218; and Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," in The Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit., 90.
17. Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 94-95; U.S. Department of State, telegrams as follows:

Paris 481, 5 August 1954  
 State to Paris for Dulles, TENDL 14, 22 October 1954  
 Manila SECTO 50, 1 March 1955  
 Saigon 4661, 19 April 1955  
 Paris 4396, 9 April 1955  
 Paris 4576, 21 April 1955  
 Paris 4780, 24 April 1955

Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Possible Developments in South Vietnam" (NIE 631-2-55, 26 April 1955), TS; Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) from his Deputy, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," (13 April 1955), TS; JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "Indochina (Vietnam)" (9 May 1955), TS; Staff Study, OSD/ISA, 13 April 1955, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," TS.

18. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 16 December 1954, 9-11.
19. Ibid., and issues for 11 October 1954, 11 November 1954, 20 January 1955, and 5 May 1955. Also, CIA National Intelligence Estimate, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956" (NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955), S, 9-10.
20. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 May 1955, Part I.
21. Ibid., 16 December 1954.

22. Report of the Saigon Military Mission, 1954-1955 (Lansdale Report), S.
23. Reported in the New York Times (March 5, 1956), and Economist (March 17, 1956).
24. See Report in Manchester Guardian, March 5, 1956.
25. Hammer, op. cit., 342-344, 346; P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 30-32; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 85-86.
26. Quoted in Gettleman, ed., Vietnam, op. cit., 193-194. U.S. Congress, Committee Print.
27. Background Information..., op. cit., 83.
28. U.S. Dept. of State, telegram, Secretary Dulles to Paris No. 77, 7 July 1954 (S). Also, President Eisenhower quoted in B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Vietnam," op. cit., 89; U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum dated 5 May 1955, "U.S. Views on All Vietnam Elections," (S), in Dept of State Research Memorandum, "The Shift in the United States Position Towards Vietnamese Elections Under the Geneva Accords," (RM-765, 1 Sept 1965), (S); Dept. of State Memorandum of Conversation between Senator Mike Mansfield and Assistant Secretary of State Walter B. Robertson, 7 Dec 1954, (TS).
29. OCB, "Progress Report...", NSC 5405, op. cit., and "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East," NSC 5429, op. cit. Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina," (NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954) (S), 1, 4, 6.
30. Dept of State, "U.S. Views on All Vietnam Elections," op. cit.
31. Ibid., Dept. of State RM-765, "The Shift in U.S. Position...", op. cit.
32. There were DRV communications with the GVR on this subject July, 1955; May and June, 1956; July, 1957; March, 1958; July, 1959; and July, 1960. Philippe Devillers, in Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 30-33. CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 July 1955; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 July 1955); B.S.N. Marti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 181-184.
33. Devillers, in Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, loc. cit.; Marti, op. cit., 176; CIA, NIE 63.2-57 (14 May 1957), op. cit., 6.
34. Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1965, Misc. No. 25 (London: HMSO, 1965), 124-125.
35. CIA, Memorandum for the Record, 8 February 1957; Marti, op. cit., 176-177; John Norton Moore, op. cit., 3, n.7. United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Special Political Committee (18th Meeting, 24 January 1957, A/SR/SR.18), 79-80.

36. American Friends of Vietnam, America's Stake in Vietnam (New York: Carnegie Press, 1956), 69.
37. NSC 5612/1 (September, 1956); NSC 5809 (2 April 1958). The First Indochina War culminated in Viet Minh military victory and the Geneva Conference of 1954, but during it a Vietnamese government under Bao Dai, like Ho Chi Minh's DRV claiming dominion over all the Vietnamese, but Nationalist, anti-Communist, and French-supported, came into being. From 1949 on, this nascent state provided the political alternative to the DRV; it was Bao Dai's regime which inherited South Viet Nam, and a counterclaim to a unified nation, after the 1954 Geneva settlement. (Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 210-223).

The United States recognized Bao Dai's regime, the GVN, on February 7, 1950. We had no relations with the DRV, although for six months after the departure of the French from the DRV in 1955, we maintained a vice-consulate in Hanoi, withdrawing it after persistent DRV isolation and harassment. Since, the United States has maintained full relations with GVN, but not even a postal exchange with the DRV. (Ibid.; 191, 194). However, although no formal U.S. recognition has been extended, we have acknowledged DRV sovereignty, at first implicitly, and then, after 1962, explicitly. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the U.S. "observer" related U.S. policy toward the DRV to that we have pursued re North Korea and East Germany. U.S. recognition of, consistent relations with, and increasingly strong support of the GVN after Geneva, were not accompanied by public policy statements more directly aimed at changing the status quo in North Viet Nam than that 1954 position. However, national policy papers of the period included the more ambitious objectives quoted.

38. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 296-299; also Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956). Ho's statement may also have been an answer to Khrushchev's 11 April 1956 speech on "peaceful competition"; Cf. U.S. Dept. of State, Soviet World Outlook (Publication 6936, July 1959), 98.
39. "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 54.
40. The table is from Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (April 11, 1955 to August 10, 1955). (London: HHSO, 1955), 30, App. IV. Cf. B.S.N. Murti, op. cit., 88-91. The U.S. Dept of State's "White Paper" of 1965 entitled Aggression from the North mentioned "more than 900,000 refugees" who fled from North Viet Nam. a/ Bernard Fall has used the figure 860,000 in his books and essays; b/ Fall also has reported that the French transported 610,000 refugees South. c/ The

U.S. Navy alone moved 310,848 refugees in "Operation Exodus," d/ and although U.S. National Intelligence Estimates in 1955 mention 650,000 refugees from the North, e/ a U.S. Department of State review of the issue in 1957 put the total at "nearly 900,000;" the current (1964) National Intelligence Survey refers to "nearly a million." f/ No better estimate is likely to be taken, given the paucity of reliable records.

- a/ U.S. Dept. of State, "Aggression from the North," Bulletin, March 22, 1965, 404-425 (esp Part V), reproduced in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 195.
  - b/ Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Nams (New York: Praeger, Revised Edition, 1964), 153-154, 358; Fall, Viet Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 76.
  - c/ Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154; Fall, "How the French...", op. cit., 81.
  - d/ U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," Interoffice Memorandum, 10 September 1957, SP/F7-16; Report of CINCPACFLT in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Vietnam, The First Five Years (Michigan State University Press, 1959), 63-76. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, History of Naval Operations, Vietnam (Naval History Division, June, 1964), 87-98.
  - e/ U.S. Intelligence Board, NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam Through July 1956" (19 July 1955) SECRET; NIE 63.1-3-55 "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956" (11 October 1955) SECRET.
  - f/ U.S. State Department, "Information on Refugees...", op. cit.; CIA, National Intelligence Survey, North Vietnam (NIS 43C, General Survey, July 1964), iv.
41. U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.
  42. Chester A. Bain, Vietnam, The Roots of Conflict (New York: Prentice Hall, 1967), 120-121; cf. Bui Van Luong and Bernard Fall in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet Nam, The First Five Years, op. cit., 48-62; GVN, Directorate General of Information, Operation Exodus (Saigon: 1959 ?), 20.
  43. U.S. Dept. of Army, Pamphlet 550-40, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam (Washington: GPO, 1962), 132-133; Bernard Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154.
  44. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (New York: Praeger, 1964), 166-168, 209-229. Hoang is a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre; Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 118-135; Bernard B. Fall,



Le Viet Minh (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), 101-105 (RAND Translation, Incl to L-13439 of 19 July 1967); and George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol 44, No. 3, April, 1966), 352-358. The proponent of these undertakings was Ho's Sino-ophile lieutenant Truong Chinh; see Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, (CIA/CR BH 6.6), item on Truong dated 15 March 1965; also Bernard B. Fall, ed., Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963), XIX-XX; P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), 11-14, 32-35, 45-46; and William Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided, The Economy of North Vietnam," in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 107-108. For Ho's statement on Land Reform in late 1952, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh's Revolution, op. cit., 258-269.

45. The ICC source is Murti, op. cit., 70-92. Thomas A. Dooley, Deliver Us From Evil, in Dr. Tom Dooley's Three Great Books (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1960), 63-70, describes the propaganda struggle. Also, Bernard Fall, The Two Viet Nams, loc. cit., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 72-75; Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York: Random House, 1966), 102-104. The Lansdale role is described in the Report of the Saigon Military Mission, "op. cit."
46. Ibid.; Bain, op. cit.; CIA, NIS 43C, op. cit., 40.
47. CINCPACFLT, "Role of the United States Navy," in Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, The First Five Years (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1959), 63-76. Part Two of ibid., 45-104 addresses "The Refugee Problem" in general, including the role of foreign aid, the GVN, and charitable organizations. Also, CIA, National Intelligence Survey, South Vietnam (NIS 43D, General Survey, April 1965), 21; U.S. Dept of State "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.; "United States Policy With Respect to Vietnam: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 92-95. The latter address by Walter S. Robinson was to the American Friends of Vietnam, and is included in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 15-19; in ibid., are speeches by Dr. Dooley and Msgr Joseph J. Barnett on refugees, 36-49. Cf., Hammer, op. cit., 351-352.
48. E.g., Dooley, Deliver Us From Evil, op. cit.; Leo Cherne in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 22-27. Robert Sheer of Ramparts magazine presents an unsympathetic critique of Dooley, Cherne, et al, in "The Genesis of United States Support for Ngo Dinh Diem," reprinted in Gettleman, ed., Viet Nam, op. cit., 235-253.
49. E.g., a mob of refugees attacked the billets of the ICC in Saigon in July, 1955, just before the consultations came due, in an apparently manipulated protest. These and other uses of refugees by the GVN are elaborated in below.

50. Frank N. Trager, Why Viet Nam? (New York: Praeger, 1966), 97.
51. U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee, Viet Minh Violations of the Geneva Agreements Through 31 December 1954 (IAC-D-93/2, 31 January 1965), 5-8; Also, Anita L. Nutt, Troika on Trial (MS Study for OSD/ISA, ARPA Contract SD-220, 1967), 410-419; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (12 August 1954), 8; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 January 1955--the latter cites a Canadian priest as source for reports of serious fighting in Vinh, Nghe An and Ba Lang, Thanh Hoa Province.
52. ICC, Fourth Interim Report..., op. cit., 12.
53. Ibid., 11, 21. The Canadians reported 11,422 first party petitions in the North, and not more than 1,000 in the South upon which no action had been taken as of 18 May 1955.
54. Ibid., 12.
55. Ibid.
56. Murti, op. cit., 76-79; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 Jan 55.
57. ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op.cit., 12-13, 23-24. The Canadian report includes the following:

"The reports of the teams disclosed further that incidents of obstruction and hindrance made it difficult for them to complete their tasks effectively. A common experience was to encounter organized groups of persons presenting petitions about forced evacuation and demonstrating in a noisy and disorderly manner, with the effect that not only was the limited time available to the team for its investigation squandered, but also would-be evacuees were intimidated....In at least a dozen instances, intending evacuees were physically molested by such hostile crowds and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity of meeting the team. Team 56 on its visit to Ha Tinh on five occasions saw individuals physically molested and dragged by force from the presence of the team....In our view this phenomenon was not a mere social manifestation but an organized plan. While it has been impossible for the Commission to prove that these measures were organized as a matter of policy by the authority in control of the North, owing to the frequency and the common features of this form of obstruction in all provinces investigated there would seem to be little doubt that these obstructions and hindrances had been deliberately planned...it is still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so...."
58. Hammer, op. cit., 345; Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 114-115; Murti, op. cit., 91-92.

59. Fall, The Two Viet Nams, 154; Ellen Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today, 149-150.
60. First and Second Interim Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam; Third Interim Report, and Fourth Interim Report. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, May, June and December 1955, respectively), passim. Cf. Murti, op. cit., 86-90; and IAC, Viet Minh Violations, op. cit.
61. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 8-9; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 96-98.
62. U.S. Dept. of State, "Information on Refugees in Vietnam," op. cit.
63. Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 102-103; Senator John F. Kennedy, "America's Stake in Vietnam," in America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 11-12; United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, Activity Report (June 30, 1954 through June 30, 1956) (Saigon: 1956); NIS 43D, op. cit., 35; Devillers, "Ngo Dinh Diem...", op. cit., 214.
64. Anita Lauve, The Origins and Operations of the International Control Commission in Laos and Vietnam (U) (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, RM-2967-AFPA, April, 1962) (S), 198-203; Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 690-691; the incident is referred to in the ICC's Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 24-25. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 21 July 1955.
65. USOM, Activity Report 1954-1956, op. cit.; Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 90, 103, 184, 195, 337, 360.
66. William A. Highswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 34-37; Scigliano, op. cit., 53-55, 169; Shepley, The Lost Revolution, op. cit., 136-137; Report of the Saigon Military Mission, FY 1955, (Lansdale Report of 1955), op. cit., 24-25.
67. Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 52-53; Scigliano, op. cit., 181-183.
68. In part, this explains the political power of the Buddhists acquired in 1963 -- an amorphous religion, so essentially apolitical and unwieldy that it was among the few Vietnamese institutions ignored by the communists, became the focus of Viet nationalism and a prime contributor to Diem's undoing. Cf., Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 468-472. Bernard Fall's essay on the "Sears of Division" quotes a Vietnamese saying that success in life hinged on "3 D's": -- Diem (family connections); Dao (religion); and Dia-phanong (province of origin). Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 206-210.

69. ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 30.
70. CIA, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957," (NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956), 10. A thesis advanced by Bernard Fall that the Viet Minh deliberately sent the families of the stay-behinds north, so that the hard-core regulars who remained in the south could engage in "mobile warfare, without having to worry about reprisals against their relatives," has not been substantiated in recent interviews with Viet Cong. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 358.
71. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 224; U.S. Dept. of State, "Southern Regroupees and Northerners in the Communist Military Force in South Vietnam," (Research Memorandum RFE-49, November 9, 1966), SECRET, iii. Fall once accepted a figure of 120,000, but later tended to a ceiling of 100,000. Cf., Fall in Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 57; and Fall, Vietnam Witness, op. cit., 216. The 130,000 total approximates the figures published by the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1956; 150,000 Viet Minh troops and their families. a/ Wilfred G. Burchett, the Australian communist, has referred to "the withdrawal of the 140,000 Viet Minh and the cadres to the north." b/. The statistic usually used in U.S. official publications -- for example in the 1965 White Paper -- is 90,000 Viet Minh troops moved north, and this is commonly regarded as an invaluable reservoir for the DRV's subsequent infiltration of South Vietnam. c/ But the dimension of this resource extended beyond 90,000 "warriors." There were Montagnards who proved particularly useful in building and protecting the infiltration routes down through the Laotian and Vietnamese Highlands. There were also children, an obvious long-range asset. d/ The DRV set up a special school for southern Montagnards, and some 14 elementary and higher schools were reserved for other southern children. e/ Moreover, there is evidence that the Viet Minh systematically broadened its family ties in the South through hundreds of hasty, directed marriages for departing "warriors" and by recruiting very young men and boys just before departure. f/
- a/ R. P. Stebbins and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), 285, quoted in Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, op. cit., 75.
- b/ Wilfred G. Burchett, Vietnam, Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (New York: International Publishers, 1965), 128.
- c/ U.S. Dept. of State, Aggression from the North (Washington: GPO, 1965) (Dept. of State Publication 7039, February, 1965), 11. Intelligence estimates of the 1954-1956 period used the figure 95,000; e.g., NIE 63-56, op. cit., 6.

- d/ The Rand Corporation is sponsoring an extensive study of the DRV role in the southern insurgency, based on captured documents and interviews with prisoners and defectors; three reports published to date are germane: J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency," RM-4140-PR (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, August, 1966); Zasloff, "Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Viet Minh Regroupees," RM-4703-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, August, 1966); Zasloff, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Viet Minh Cadres," RM-5613-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, March, 1967). For data on children and Montagnards, see RM-4140, 33-34; and RM-4703, 1, 25, 29-30; also Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 358.
- e/ Report 204/64 of the GVN National Interrogation Center, Saigon, cited in RM-4703, op. cit., 30-31; Cf., Wilfred G. Burchett, The Furtive War (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 146-147.
- f/ Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian, op. cit., 142-143, reported 500 marriages in Quang Ngai Province alone -- and 20,000 families there with close relatives in the North; Wesley Fishel, "Vietnam's. War of Attrition," The New Leader (December 7, 1959), 17 identified 300 marriages with departing Viet Minh in Binh Dinh Province: both cited in RM-4140, op. cit., 33. Concerning the recruitment of youth, see RM-4703, op. cit., 26; and the Report of the Saigon Military Mission, FY 1955, (Lansdale Report of 1955), 34.

72. NIE 63-56, op. cit., 10.
73. U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, Draft Memorandum, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam," (DIAAP-4, May, 1967), op. cit., 16-17.
74. "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, July 20, 1954," and "Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to South-east Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: GPO, March, 1966), 39, 66.

A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary; according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

- "(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.

"(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.

"(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A Viet Cong cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup....They were afraid...."

Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ Asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?": the following responses were typical: d/

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.

(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PA) [Our political officer] explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

a/ RM-4703, op. cit., 27, 35.

b/ Ibid., 34.

c/ Ibid., 35.

d/ Ibid., 36.

75. Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12, 21; Murti, op. cit., 87-88.
76. RM-5163, op. cit., 6-7.
77. Ngo Dinh Diem on Elections in Vietnam (July 16, 1955) in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 193-194. For the U.S. view, see for example, the March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles, public statement on the consultations scheduled to take place between DRV and GVN preliminary to the general elections; inter alia, he opined that it would "be hard to create in the North conditions which allow genuine freedom of choice." U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," (Historical Studies Division, Research Project No. 747, Nov 1965), 12.
78. RM-4703, op. cit., 8; U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam," op. cit., 17-18.
79. Anita Lauve Mutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 296-360; ICC Interim Report (S).
80. "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, July 20, 1954," in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 55-57.
81. ICC, Eighth Interim Report (Saigon, 5 June 1958), 13.
82. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Office of Program Coordination, March 17, 1967), 57. The total through 1964 was over \$1 billion; NIS 43D, op. cit., 70.
83. V. J. Croizat, trans., A Translation from the French: Lessons of the War in Indochina (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, RM-5271-PR, May, 1967), 204-205.
84. J. J. Zasloff, The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946-1954 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, RM-4618-PR, May, 1967), 57.
85. NIS 43C, op. cit., 38; CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam," (Current Intelligence Memo, SC No. 03025/64).
86. IAC-D-93/2, Viet Minh Violations...Through 31 December 1954, op. cit., 10-11; also CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 October 1954, 6.

87. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.
88. Ibid., 56-59; Zasloff, Political Motivation...The Vietminh Begroup-  
ees, FM-4703-ISA/ARPA; op. cit., 44-52.
89. CIA, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam" (NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 August 1961), 15; CIA, "The Outlook for North Vietnam," (SNIE 14.3-64, 4 March 1964), 8-9.
90. Ibid., 10.
91. U.S. Congress, Senate, Situation in Vietnam, Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, July 30 and 31, 1959 (Washington: GPO, 1959), 156-158; Irving Heymont, Ronald B. Emery, John G. Phillips, Cost Analysis of Counterinsurgency Land-Combat Operations: Vietnam, 1957-1964 (U) (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corp., RAC-TP-232, June, 1967), 10; Senator Mansfield, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Report on Indochina," 83d Congress, 2nd Session, 15 October 1954 (Washington: GPO, 1954). On January 14, 1955, the French signed an agreement with the DRV supplementing the Geneva Agreement calling for detailed advance notice to the ICC and defining replacement arms as identical, or of similar "combat strength"--but again did not establish the basic credit ceiling against which the GVN could draw replacements. Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 329-342; RM-2967, op. cit., 105-106. For aid data, see MS, Office Chief of Military History, "U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam Since 1945," (May, 1962), 31, 49-50. The estimate of French removal of MDAP materiel 1954-1956 is based on the report of Asst SecDef Reuben Robertson, Jr., on trip to Vietnam in May, 1956; ibid., 49-50, n. 34. U.S. Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries," 20 July 1956, p. 10, reports that contrary to a US-French agreement, shipments to North Africa and France 1955-1956 apparently included higher quality MDAP equipment than was being turned over to ARVN; the same report also states that details of ARVN-French transaction with MDAP materiel were "unknown."
92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 67.
93. Warner, The Last Confucian, op. cit., 128-219. Scigliano, South Vietnam, op. cit., 162-163.
94. NIS 43D, op. cit., 69.
95. Heymont, et al., Cost Analysis...1957-1964, op. cit., Vol. II, 77-84.
96. U.S. Dept. of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954.
97. "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto...", in U.S. Congress, Background Information..., op. cit., 84-88.



98. "Direct Aid to the Associated States...", in ibid., 88-89.
99. "Aid to the State of Vietnam...", in ibid., 89-90.
100. Quoted in Nighswonger, op. cit., 42, from New York Times for February 13, 1955, p. 1. General Collins, the President's emissary to the GVN, was reported at the same time to be pressing for a "more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from external aggression supplied by SEATO. Ibid., quoting Baltimore Sun for 1 February 1955, p. 1.
101. NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," (September 5, 1956), 11, provides that the U.S. will: "assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." "United initial resistance" was defined by JCS memo for SecDef, dated 21 December 1956, subject as above, as follows: "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the UN Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral assistance and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked."
102. "Vietnam's Defense Capacity," in The American Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 86.
103. Scigliano, op. cit., 163; Judson J. Conner, "Teeth for the Free World Dragon," Army Information Digest (November, 1960), 43.
104. U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram JCS 974802 of 30 March 1960 to CINCPAC noted increasingly deteriorating internal security in Vietnam and informed that:

"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare." This cable among many of that period refocused the MAAG Mission on internal security, and this became the central theme of the military portions of the "Counter-insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam" of January, 1961. U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Despatch No. 276, of January 4, 1961. The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistic superstructure of ARVN, and on

U.S. Army-type training programs; throughout, it is clear that the MAAG looked increasingly to the Self Defense Corps, the Civil Guard, and the National Police to meet the "Viet Minh" internal threat in order to free ARVN for conventional combat training. See especially U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, non-NATO Countries," paragraphs 1, 5, 6, and Section C, of the reports 15 January 1956, 20 July 1956, 21 January 1957, 15 July 1957; also, same headquarters, "Narrative Study," dated 24 August 1958, and "Narrative Statement," dated 25 November 1958 with changes dated 10 May 1959, 9 August 1959, and 8 November 1959. Cf., Shaplen, op. cit., 117-119, 137; Warner, op. cit., 129-136; Scigliano, op. cit., 162-167; Nighswonger, op. cit., 43-48, David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1965), 60-66.

105. David Hotham, "South Vietnam - Shaky Bastion," New Republic, November 25, 1957, 15; Scigliano, op. cit., 118-119.
106. Ibid., 111-115. The author concluded that the Saigon--Bien Hoa Highway had been undertaken for military reasons, and that "this 20-mile stretch of highway cost more money than the United States provided for all labor, community development, social welfare, housing, health, and education projects in Vietnam combined during the entire period 1954-1961."
107. ICC, Second Interim Report..., op. cit., 55.
108. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 17 November 1954, subject: "General Collins' Recommendations Regarding Military Force Levels in Vietnam."
109. JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," sets an objective of a minimum French force of four divisions until four RVNAF divisions were available to replace them; it also stresses that the Geneva Agreement constituted in Vietnam "a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment." In a JCS Memo of 19 October 1954, subject: "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," the Chiefs, noting the Geneva limit on personnel, recommended against MAAG's RVNAF unless "political considerations are overriding." In a Memo of 17 November 1954, subject: "Indochina," the JCS addressed the problem of a 77,000 man RVNAF, and found it adequate for internal security only; noting the Viet Minh strength, they stated that a force of that size could not provide for external security if French forces were withdrawn, but agreed that the MAAG could train RVNAF at that level while complying with Geneva ceilings on personnel. Other examples of the continuing U.S. concern for observing the Geneva Agreements on the one hand, and on the other hand proceeding with the task of providing for Vietnam's security within its restrictions are provided in the MAAG, Country Statements, op. cit., and in U.S. Dept of State telegram 2601 from Paris, of 19 December 1954, in which Secretary Dulles accepted.

the principle that U.S. should not contravene the settlement. Dept of State telegram 3441 from Saigon of 17 February 1955 discloses Ambassador Collins' concern for observing the agreements even when observance precluded U.S. assistance for refugees.

110. Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 315-326. Though questionable on some judgments -- e.g., attributing to the "civilian branch of the U.S. Government" a view that was in opposition to that of "military authorities" and against U.S. assumption of RVNAF training, Mrs. Nutt is essentially correct in her assertion that the U.S. abided by the Geneva ceilings for six years. The principal departure from the 342 strength accommodated TERM, a 350-man Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission which from May 1956 to December 1960 worked to recover, control and outship MDAP supplies -- albeit upgrading the RVNAF logistic capability significantly in the process. The first substantial increase in MAAG followed a February, 1960, GVN request, which raised the ceiling from 342 to 685 -- still below the figure of 888, the combined 1954 strength of French cadres with RVNAF and MAAGs.
111. H.M.G., Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1965 (London: H.M.S.O., December, 1965), 110-125.
112. Ibid.
113. Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists (Saigon, July 1959).
114. ICC, Sixth Interim Report..., op. cit., 31-32.
115. ICC, Seventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 16-17.
116. ICC, Eighth Interim Report..., op. cit., 11-13; Lauve, RM-2967-AREA, op. cit., 208.
117. ICC, Eleventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 17.
118. American Friends of Vietnam, America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 8-14.
119. Ibid., 15-19.
120. Ibid., passim.
121. Ibid., 101-102.
122. Ibid., 106-107.
123. E.g., U.S. Dept of State, "Legal Basis for U.S. Military Aid to South Vietnam," (Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 10, August 1967).

## IV.A.5.

Tab 2

FOOTNOTES

1. Hammer, op. cit., 26-35; Shaplen, op. cit., 128-132. Also, U.S. Department of State, Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists (Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949), passim.
2. Chester A. Bain, Vietnam, The Roots of Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 69.
3. Ibid., 93-95. Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2 vols.), I, 172-174.
4. Ibid., 18-24, 89; Hammer, op. cit., 118, 229, 284-287, 347-48, 360-62; Shaplen, 116-119. U.S. Department of the Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam (DA Pamphlet 550-105, 1966), 808-824--W.B., maps in text of sect areas are drawn from this source.
5. Warner, op. cit., 95-96; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 155-158; Bain, op. cit., 118; Report of the Saigon Military Mission, op. cit., 28.
6. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 142-148; DA Pamphlet 550-105, op. cit., 826-860; NIS 43D, 32.
7. Ibid.; DA Pamphlet 550-105, op. cit., 1020-1048.
8. U.S. Department of State, The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Office of Intelligence Research, 29 December 1955), 8-10.
9. See map, Tab 1, p.21.
10. Ibid.; U.S. Dept. State, The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, op. cit., 10.
11. Ibid., 10-15; A. L. Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 250-253.
12. Douglas Pike Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT, 1966), 2-30; Rand Corporation Memoranda dealing with Viet Cong motivation and morale (Santa Monica dates shown): W. S. Davison and J. J. Zasloff, A Profile of Viet Cong Cadres, RM-4983-ISA/ARPA, June, 1966; Zasloff, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit.; L. Goure, A. J. Russo, and D. Scott, Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, RM-4911-ISA/ARPA.
13. This lack of de facto independence has figured in recent controversy over Diem's responsibility to the Geneva Agreement signed by France, e.g., Kahn and Lewis, op. cit., 56-57.

14. Scigliano, op. cit., 62-68. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 93, 94.
15. The summary account of Diem's life draws principally on Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 234 ff.; Warner, op. cit., 84 ff.; Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, 100 ff.; Scigliano, op. cit., 13 ff.
16. E.g. Shaplen, op. cit., 101; or Wesley R. Fishel, "Vietnam's Democratic One-Man Rule," in Gettleman, ed., op. cit., 197-198.
17. Shaplen, loc. cit.; Scigliano, op. cit., 17.
18. E.g. Robert Sheer, op. cit., 240-241.
19. Diem's acquaintances in the U.S. included Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, Senator John F. Kennedy, and Senator Mike Mansfield, as well as Cardinal Spellman.
20. U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum of Conversation among Senator Mansfield, Assistant Secretary W. S. Robertson, et al., 7 December 1954.
21. U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum from Ambassador Heath to Asst. Secy. Robertson, 17 December 1954.
22. General J. Lawton Collins, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated 20 January 1955, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," 9.
23. U.S. Dept of State, telegram, Saigon 4399, April 7, 1955.
24. U.S. Dept of State, telegram, Saigon 4663, April 19, 1955.
25. U.S. Dept of State, Memo for Asst. SecState Robertson, 30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation," which foresaw trouble on the Hill if Diem were forced out.  
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 101 (Washington: GPO, May 2, 1955), 5290.
26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 9 May 1955, subject: "Indochina (Vietnam)."
27. U.S. Dept of State, telegram, SECTO 50 from Manila, 1 March 1955, reports that Secretary Dulles "told Diem that U.S. Government -- President and himself -- had great stake in him and in Vietnam... if there is failure here, U.S. prestige would be gravely affected"; also Resch. Memo 765, op. cit.
28. Scigliano, op. cit., 101-105.
29. Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La Fin d'Une Guerre (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), 306.

30. Shaplen, 106. Diem considered himself a Catholic of the Spanish vice French tradition: fiercely militant, rather than intellectual and tolerant in the Gallic mode. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 236-238. Cf., Warner, op. cit., 90.
31. Ibid., 237.
32. Scigliano, op. cit., 58. U.S. Dept of State, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, dated 23 April 1955, "Report on Vietnamese Political Situation," and Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, 30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation."
33. Scigliano, op. cit., 60; David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1964), 55; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 252-253.
34. Scigliano, op. cit., 56-57.
35. Ibid., 58, 75-76, 110-111; Warner, op. cit., 32, 307-308; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 246-252.
36. Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U. Press, 1965), 168.
37. Ibid., 168, 169.
38. Ibid., 79-82.
39. Ibid., 165-171.
40. Shaplen, op. cit., 131.
41. Report of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), op. cit.
42. Warner, op. cit., 116-117, 214, 224; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 250; Scigliano, op. cit., 75-80; Shaplen, op. cit., 128-132.
43. Scigliano, loc. cit.
44. Ibid., 77.
45. Report of the Saigon Military Mission, op. cit.; Scigliano, op. cit., 20-21.
46. U.S. Dept of State, telegrams: to Saigon 4756 of 27 April 1955; to Saigon 4757 of 27 April 1955; to Saigon ---- of 28 April 1955 (draft); to Saigon 5600 of 1 May 1955.
- Memorandum from K. T. Young, Jr., to Asst Secy Robertson, 30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation"; Shaplen, op. cit., 122-125; Report of the SMM, op. cit.

47. Warner, op. cit., 105-106.
48. U.S. Dept of State, telegrams: from Paris 4767 of 2 May 1955; from Saigon 5074 of 5 May 1955; also, Shaplen, op. cit., 121-125; Bain, op. cit., 118-119.
49. Ibid., SECTO 8 of May 8, 1955.
50. Ibid., TEDUL 2 of May 8, 1955.
51. Ibid., TEDUL 9 of May 9, 1955.
52. Shaplen, op. cit., 127; Warner, op. cit., 101.
53. Ibid., 103.
54. NSC 5809, 2 April 1958, and Progress Report of 28 May 1958.
55. U.S. Congress, Senate, Situation in Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs (86th Congress, First Session, July 30-31, 1959), 171.
56. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 110-115; Tillman Durdin, "Red Activities Up in Vietnam," New York Times (April 13, 1959), 5; U.S. Senate, Background Information..., op. cit., 5; CIA, NSC Briefing for 16 August 1958; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement," narratives for 21 January 1957, 15 July 1957, 22 January 1958; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 15 and 16 August 1958; U.S. Dept of State, Saigon 268 of 13 August 1958, and Saigon 278 of 14 August 1958; CIA, Saigon CS-3366824 of 14 August 1958.
57. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.
58. Ibid., Warner, op. cit., 104-105; DA Pamphlet 550-105, 819, 845, 1036; Scigliano, op. cit., 89; Shaplen, op. cit., U.S. Dept of State "The Communist Subversive Threat to the Treaty Area" (Office of Intelligence Research, October 24, 1956), Annex, "Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," 15.
59. Report of the Saigon Military Mission, op. cit., 22-26; Shaplen, op. cit., 135-137.
60. Ibid.; Report of the SMM, op. cit., 43-44; CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 May 1955 on "South Vietnam."
61. David Hotham, "South Vietnam--Shaky Bastion," New Republic (November 25, 1957), 15.
62. Memorandum for the Record by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, dated 15 July 1958, subject: "Pacification in Vietnam"; also, Report of the SMM, op. cit., 24-25; Scigliano, op. cit., William A. Highswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 35-37.

63. Kahan and Lewis, op. cit., 102.
64. Scigliano, op. cit., 121; Shaplen, op. cit., 143.
65. Ibid., 104-105, 121-124; GVN, 7 Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administration (Saigon: October 26, 1961), 319-368.
66. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 308, Shaplen, op. cit., 145.
67. Ibid., Scigliano, loc. cit., Pike, op. cit. 62-63.
68. Scigliano, op. cit., 177-178; Nighswonger, op. cit., 40.
69. Bain, op. cit., 122, Scigliano, op. cit., 91-98; Shaplen, op. cit., 133-134.
70. Ibid.
71. Scigliano, op. cit., 64-77, 160-162, 167-172.
72. Ibid., 168.
73. Ibid., 170-171.
74. Ibid.
75. Kahan and Lewis, op. cit., 99-102.
76. Ibid.; P.J. Honey, "The Problem of Democracy in Vietnam," The World Today (No. 16, February, 1960), 73.
77. Scigliano, op. cit., 169.
78. Ibid., 173-174; Nighswonger, op. cit., 40.
79. Ibid., 45; Scigliano, op. cit., 169-172.
80. Ibid., 114; Nighswonger, 45-46; John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1966), 72-83.
81. Pike, op. cit., 13-14; Scigliano, 181-182.
82. Kahan and Lewis, op. cit., 107.
83. Nighswonger, op. cit., 46; Scigliano, op. cit., 178-183.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 179.
86. Ibid., 180; Nighswonger, op. cit., 46.



87. Ibid., 46ff; Scigliano, 180-183.
88. Ibid., 163-164; Zasloff, RM-5163-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 27; Nighswonger, op. cit., 43-45.
89. Scigliano, op. cit., 33; Shaplen, op. cit., 133-134.
90. Scigliano, op. cit., 167.
91. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 252-253; Scigliano, op. cit., 81, 187; Kahin and Lewis, 109-110, 113.
92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 40; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 109-110; Shaplen, 253-254.
93. Ibid., Scigliano, op. cit., 82-85; Warner, op. cit., 107-124.
94. Ibid., P. J. Honey, "Progress in the Republic of Vietnam," World Today (Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1959), 73-74. The passage from Thoi Duan is quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 270-271.
95. Warner, op. cit., 110-111.
96. Text is from Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 432-438.
97. Scigliano, op. cit., 177-178.
98. Quoted in Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op. cit., 350-351.
99. NIS 43D, op. cit., 39-40; CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam" (No. 0811/66, 4 May 1966), and "The Vulnerability of Non-Communist Groups in South Vietnam to Viet Cong Political Subversion" (No. 0829/66, 27 May 1966).
100. Scigliano, op. cit., 207.
101. Ibid., 203, 207; Report of the SMM, op. cit., 9-16.
102. Ibid., 39-40, 44-45; Shaplen, 125-126; Warner, 102-106. U.S. Dept. of State, Telegram Paris to State 4743, 30 April 1955, and Paris to State 4746, 30 April 1955.
103. Scigliano, op. cit., 165-166.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 162-165; Montgomery, op. cit., 62-70.
106. Scigliano, op. cit. 187-188, Shaplen, op. cit., 141-142.

107. Scigliano, op. cit., 187-188.
108. Scigliano, op. cit., 217-225; Shaplen, op. cit., 188-212.
109. John Osborne, "The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam," Life, May 13, 1957; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 99-101; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 235.
110. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 101-102.
111. Report of L. B. Woodbury, Jr., Col, GS, US Army Attache, Saigon, for July, 1956.
112. William Henderson, "South Viet Nam Finds Itself," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 35, No. 2, January, 1957), 285, 288; quoted in Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 100.
113. Quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 324.
114. P. J. Honey, "Progress in the Republic of Vietnam," World Today (Vol. 15, No. 2, Feb., 1959), 75.
115. P. J. Honey, "The Problem of Democracy in Vietnam," op. cit., 72-73.
116. Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, USA (Ret), America's Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 6.
117. Diem, Ibid., 101-102.
118. Quoted in Warner, op. cit., 91-93.
119. Ibid., 92.
120. This same misapprehension appears in U.S. "counterinsurgency" literature; e.g. W. W. Rostow: "Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building." W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Under-developed Areas," Speech at the U.S.A. Special Warfare School, June, 1961, in Raskin and Fall, eds., op. cit., 113.
121. Diem, quoted in Ibid., 127-128.
122. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 59.
123. Pike, op. cit., facing 1.
124. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 121; quoting a GVN pamphlet and Ellen J. Hammer. Cf. references to Viet Cong forces in North Vietnam in US MAAG Vietnam, "Narrative Study (U)," August 1958 and other dates.

125. Zasloff, RM-4140-PR, op. cit., 31; and RM-5163-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., passim; Estimates of Viet Minh strength are based on French data in Croizat, trans., RM-5271-PR, op. cit.
126. Zasloff, RM-5163-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., passim.
127. The document is known in intelligence circles as "the CRIMP Document," having been captured by elements of the US 1st Infantry Division in the Iron Triangle area of Binh Duong Province on Operation CRIMP, 6-14 January 1966. Its accuracy and authenticity have been verified by US authorities.
128. USMACV, Report of Interrogation of Nguyen Van Tron, captured by ARVN 19 November 1964 in Han Nghia Province.
129. Pike, op. cit., 76-77.
130. Ibid.
131. Thoi Luan, 15 December 1957, quoted in Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 185.
132. Ibid., 185-186.
133. Ibid., 160; CIA, NSC Briefing for 23 October 1957.
134. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 110.
135. CIA, NSC Briefing of 30 November 1957.
136. DIA, "North Vietnamese Role in the Origins...", op. cit.
137. Shaplen, op. cit., 138.
138. U.S. Senate, Background Information..., op. cit., 5; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 160.
139. Quoted in ibid.
140. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 317, 324.
141. George A. Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol 44, No. 3, April, 1966), 359.
142. Warner, 154; GVN White Paper, Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists, op. cit., 107.
143. Dept. of State, Saigon Despatch 278 to State, 7 March 1960, and CIA, SNIE 63.1-60, Short Term Trends in South Vietnam (23 August 1960). Cf. U.S. Congress, House, Current Situation in the Far East, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Aug. 14, 1959, p. 323.

144. Pike, op. cit., 102.
145. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 239; 360-361.
146. New York Times (May 5, 1961), 10.
147. Time, 7 November 1960.
148. U.S. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam (Far Eastern Series 110, Washington, December 1961), Part I, 13.
149. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 172, 184-185; and Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 317 ff.
150. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 16 August 1958; CIA Saigon CS-336624, 14 Aug 1958; and U.S. Dept. of State, telegrams Saigon to State 268 and 278 of 13 and 14 August, 1958.
151. Gerald Hickey, Village in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 10.
152. Quoted in Scigliano, op. cit., 138.
153. Pike, op. cit., 85.
154. Ibid., 78.
155. Scigliano, op. cit., 138.
156. Warner, op. cit., 159; Saigon to State Despatch 278, op. cit.
157. U.S. Dept. of State, telegrams, Saigon to State 2288 of 1 Feb 1960, and 2301 of 2 Feb 1960; Warner, op. cit., 160; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 435; Raskin and Fall, eds., op. cit., 120.
158. Saigon to State 2301 of 2 Feb 1960.
159. Scigliano, op. cit., 140; DIAAP4, North Vietnamese Role..., op. cit., 31.
160. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 282.
161. U.S. Dept. of State, Despatch 278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960, p. 8 of Encl 1; Cf. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.
162. Ibid.
163. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 101-102; Gottleman, ed., op. cit., 256-260; Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York: Random House, 1966), 29-30; Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 272.

164. U.S. Department of State, Despatch 278, op. cit., Encl 1, p. 11.
165. Pike, op. cit., 82, quoting a Radio Hanoi broadcast of June 5, 1964. A CIA agent in 1956 reported that Southern Party organizations had been directed to merge with the Fatherland Front, CIA, Singapore, CS-82270, 16 January 1956.
166. Cf., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 113-116. Also: "New National Front Formed in S. Vietnam," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, 31 January 1961, pp. EEE 13-17. On 2 February 1961 (ibid., 2 Feb, EE 5), Radio Hanoi elaborated: "The French language paper LA DEPECHE DU CAMBODGE [Of Phnom Penh, Cambodia] . . . on 24 December announced that it had received the manifesto of the front which said that it had come into existence to meet the aspiration of the South Vietnamese people, and that it undertook to liberate them from My-Diem slavery." [The same paper quoted REUTERS, report dated 24 December] "the front may have intensified its political activities in the countryside and among the South Vietnamese armed forces . . ." The U.S. Department of State, however, has taken the view that the NLF was formed in Hanoi; cf., the "White Papers" of 1961 and 1965, op. cit., and Letter, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans, 5 March 1968.
167. Carver, op. cit., 361.
168. For the "official" (February 11, 1961) text of the NLF Manifesto, see Pike, op. cit., 82, 344-347; and CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam" (1603/66, 26 September 1966), Annex II.
169. Pike, op. cit., 347-348.
170. Ibid., 351.
171. Ibid., 350-351.
172. Ibid., 356; "zone" refers to the two "regrouping zones" established by the Armistice Agreement of 1954.
173. Ibid., 358-369.
174. CIA, Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, op. cit., 5-6.
175. Biographical information on 73 of the leaders and key cadre of the NLF and affiliated organizations indicates that 66% (48) of this group were born in South Vietnam, and that an additional 8 are probably Southerners. Only 2 of the 73 were certainly born in the North, while an additional 2 may have been born there. (The birthplace of 13 of the 73 is unknown.) It can also be ascertained from the biographical data that at least 60 of the 73 are highly educated, particularly so by Asian standards. Ibid.
176. Ibid., I-44 to I-46.
177. Ibid., 426-427.

178. Ibid., 115.
179. Quoted in Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York: Praeger, 1964), 12-13.
180. I. Milton Sacks, in Frank N. Trager, ed., Marxism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959), 166.
181. Pike, op. cit., 137.
182. Ibid., 138.
183. Loc. cit.
184. Ibid., 137.
185. Cf. U.S. Department of State "White Papers" of 1961 and 1965, and Carver, op. cit., 362-363. Douglas Pike's
186. Pike, op. cit., 75-76.

## FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (2d Revised Edition), Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, 1966), 36-48. Article 14 of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, July 20, 1954" describes "political and administrative measures," 39-40.
2. Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1955), 6-7. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet Nams (New York: Praeger, Revised Edition, 1964), 129.
3. State Department Memorandum, INR/REA/AC: Brieman, 5/7/67.

Countries Maintaining Relations with DRV  
(\* Resident in Peking)

Ambassador			Consul
Albania	Guinea*	North Korea	France
Algeria*	Hungary	Poland	India
Bulgaria	Indonesia	Romania	UK
Communist China	Laos	UAR*	
Cuba	Mali*	USSR	
Czechoslovakia	Mongolia	Yugoslavia*	
East Germany			

U.S. Dept. of State, Ltr. Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans (March 5, 1968) gives 24 countries, 12 communist. Cf., John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, (Vol. 61, No. 1, January 1967), 2-4; also, Fall, op. cit., 204; and P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), 40-41.

4. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op. cit., 179; Bernard Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 156 ff. translates the full text.
5. Ibid., 178, 181; DA Pamphlet 550-40, op. cit., 235.
6. Ibid., 179. It should be noted that this announcement followed the peasant revolt in Nghe-An Province in November 1956.
7. A translated text of the 1960 Constitution is in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 409 ff.
8. The National Assembly is elected for 4 years by universal, direct, and secret suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 50,000 citizens. Article 44 establishes the Assembly as the "only legislative authority." Two meetings per year are prescribed. The Assembly

The flowchart illustrates the structure and powers of the Government of India, showing the hierarchy from the National Assembly down to Villages.

- NATIONAL ASSEMBLY** (4 Year Term) / Annual Meetings leads to the **PRESIDENT**.
- The **PRESIDENT** appoints/disappoints the **VICE PRESIDENT**, who in turn appoints/disappoints the **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**.
- The **PRESIDENT** also appoints/disappoints members of the **NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL** and the **SUPREME POLITICAL CONFERENCE**.
- The **PRESIDENT** appoints/disappoints the **STANDING COMMITTEE**, which provides recommendations to the President.
- The **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** includes heads of State Commissions, National Bank, and Ministries.
- The **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** oversees the **MINISTRIES, COMMISSIONS, AND CENTRAL AGENCIES**.
- The **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** oversees the **Administrative Committees** at various levels.
- The **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** oversees the **Supreme Court**.
- The **PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** oversees the **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL**, which apparently has both police and prosecutorial functions.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **Regional Control Organs**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **Regional Courts**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **"AUTONOMOUS REGIONS," PROVINCES, AND CITIES**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **DISTRICTS AND TOWNS**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **VILLAGES**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **People's Councils** at various levels.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **Administrative Committees** at various levels.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **Regional Courts**.
- The **PEOPLE'S SUPREME ORGAN OF CONTROL** oversees the **Regional Control Organs**.

**KEY:**

- $\Rightarrow$  Statutory Election
- $\Rightarrow$  Broad Powers of Appointment, Supervision, and Review
- $\cdots \Rightarrow$  Appeal
- $\cdots \cdots \Rightarrow$  Recommendation of Appointment

## CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT



9. Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 35, also 67-108; Cf., "Let Us Step Up the Theory-Formulating Task of the Party," Hoc Tap (No. 9, September 1966), in Joint Publications Research Service, "Translations from Hoc Tap" (No. 38,660, November 16, 1966), p. 2. Also, U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam," (DIAAP-4, May 1967) SECRET, Draft, 1-6.
10. NIS 43C, op. cit., 28-32.
11. Hoc Tap, op. cit.
12. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 12, 30.
13. Ibid., George A. Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1966), 361; Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 11, 308, 313, 327-329, 356.
14. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 101, 182-183; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (22 September 1955), B.S.N. Murti; op. cit., 191.
15. NIS 43C, 27; Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook - North Vietnam (CIA/CRBH 6.6).
16. Ibid.
17. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Militant and Moderate Elements in the North Vietnamese Communist Party" (Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence, 1 December 1955); P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 28-35.
18. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 11, compared with CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.
19. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 339-340.
20. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (New York: Praeger, 1964), 166-168, 209-229. Hoang is a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre; Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956), 118-135; Bernard B. Fall, Le Viet Minh (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), 101-105 (RAND Translation, Incl to L-13439 of 19 July 1967); and George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," Foreign Affairs (Vol 44, No. 3, April 1966), 352-358. The proponent of these undertakings was Ho's Sino-ophile lieutenant Truong Chinh; see Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, North Vietnam-South Vietnam (CIA/CR BH 6.6), item on Truong dated 15 March 1965; also Bernard B. Fall, ed., Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963), XIX-XX; P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), 11-14, 32-35, 45-46; and William Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided, The Economy of North Vietnam," in P. J. Honey, ed., North

Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 107-108. For Ho's statement on Land Reform in late 1953, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 258-269; the statement was made to the Third Session of the National Assembly of the DRV (Dec 1-4, 1953), in which the Assembly enacted an Agrarian Reform Law based on reports by Ho and Pham Van Dong.

21. Truong Chinh, The Resistance Will Win (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960; Facsimile Edition, New York: Praeger, 1963), 211.
22. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, loc. cit.
23. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 211.
24. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 8-9; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 96-98.
25. Hoang, op. cit., and Gerard Tongees, L'Enfer communiste du Nord Vietnam (Paris: Les Nouvelles Editions Debrass, 1960), are both sometime residents of the DRV, the former a Viet Minh defector of 1955, and the latter a French professor who left Hanoi in 1959. Their accounts of the agrarian reform campaign are consistent with eye witness reports recently collected from prisoners and defectors in South Vietnam, reported in J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Vietminh Regroupees (U) (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, August 1966) (Confidential), 44-53, 159-160. The best short summary is that of CIA Staffer George A. Carver, op. cit. For contemporary intelligence estimates, see: U.S. Intelligence Board, National Intelligence Estimate:

NIE 63-5-54 (3 Aug 1954)  
 NIE 63.1-55 (19 Jul 1955)  
 Special NIE 63.1-4-55 (13 Sep 1955)  
 NIE 63.1-3-55 (11 Oct 1955)  
 NIE 63-56 (17 Jul 1956)  
 NIE 63.2-57 (14 May 1957)  
 NIE 63-59 (26 May 1959)

Also: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (INR) International Communism, Annual Review (December 1955) (5650.49) (SECRET) 82-83; INR, International Communism, Asian Communist Orbit Review 1955 (January 1956) (5650.50) (SECRET) 19; INR, "North Vietnam Braces Itself for Socialism," (Oct. 13, 1958) (7837) (SECRET) 2-5, 17-18; INR, "The Outlook for North and South Vietnam," (May 5, 1959) (8008, SECRET/NOFORN), 25-26; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (6 December 1956).

26. For a description of village polity in South Vietnam which suggests why Northerners might have reacted adversely to disruption of the traditional society see Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 178-211.

27. DRV Government Decree No. 239 of March 1953, translated in Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, op. cit., 172-178, is an early example; the process was considerably refined thereafter. A particularly vivid eye-witness account is in Zasloff, op. cit., 47-48.
28. Hoang, op. cit., Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.
29. Carver, op. cit., 354; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Ellen Hammer: "at least 50,000 were killed"; Hammer, op. cit., 341.
30. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 305-309.
31. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 156-158.
32. Hoang, op. cit., 209-210, quoting Nhan Dan, No. 970 (Oct. 31, 1956).
33. USIS, Saigon, "Notes on the Anniversary of the Peasant Uprising in Nghe-An" (November, 1967).
34. Ibid.
35. Hoang, op. cit., 224-228. For data on employment of Southerners against the uprisings, see DIA "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin...." op. cit., esp. Vol II, Item 84, 80, Text, p. 74.
36. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 101-102.
37. Lauve, op. cit., 428-429.
38. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 157.
39. Lauve, op. cit., 428.
40. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33. It is significant that the DRV armed forces near the border assumed a defensive posture in 1956; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (31 May 1956).
41. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 102; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit., 169.
42. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, loc. cit.
43. Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.
44. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124.
45. Ibid., 25, 39; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 188-190; Hoang, op. cit., 228-239.
46. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 187.

47. NIS 43C, op. cit., 39.
48. Hoang, op. cit., 212-213.
49. NIS 43C, op. cit., 25, 43.
50. Ibid., 41.
51. Ibid., 35-38, 41-50, 52-53.
52. Ibid., 45.
53. Ibid., 53.
54. Ibid., 52.
55. Loc. cit.
56. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, 296. It should be noted that in the same context Ho offered "preferential" economic relations with France; no such offers were repeated after 1956, when it was clear that France would not meet its Geneva commitments to the DRV, and was pulling out of Vietnam.
57. Harold Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (New York: 1947), reprinted in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 50.
58. Ho was born in 1890, and left Vietnam for revolutionary exile in 1910 or 1911. Central Intelligence Agency, Biographic Handbook, North Vietnam-South Vietnam (CIA/CR EH 6.6, entry for Ho dated 21 January 1965).
59. Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 232-244, 260, 276; Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 251.
60. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies," (SNIE 14.3-63, 26 June 1963; Central Intelligence Agency, North Vietnam, General Survey (National Intelligence Survey, NIS 43C, July 1964), 32-33, Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 99-104.
61. Pravda quote from U.S. Department of State, "Viet Minh Reactions to Indochina Settlement" (Intelligence Brief, 5 August 1954), CONFIDENTIAL, in U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam." (DIAAP-4, May, 1967) SECRET Draft, Supporting Documents, Vol I., Item 15. The Soviet UN delegate is quoted in B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing

House, 1964), 176-177; and in John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, Vol 61, No. 1, January, 1967), 3 (n.7). CIA, Memo for Record, 8 Feb 1957, on the Soviet UN proposal of 24 January 1957.

62. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 272

63. Ibid., 334

64. Cf., Bain, op. cit., 54-78; Hoang, op. cit., XIV, XV; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 4-6, 16-19. Even the name of the country reflects the turmoil of its history. Gia Long called his empire Nam Viet (South Viet). Since the Dai Viet were ethnically related to the people of Kwang-si and Kwang-tung, the Chinese decided that the name Nam Viet implied an irredenta, and reversed the name to Viet Nam. Up to 1945, Gia Long's successors used the more pretentious name Dai Nam (Great South), but only internally, when the DRV revived "Vietnam."

65. Pike, op. cit., 48.

66. Bernard Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Signet, 1968), 242. (Hereafter cited as "Signet Edition").

67. Quoted in Pike, op. cit., 67.

68. Cf., J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Viet-minh Regroupees (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, August, 1966, R4-4703-ISA/ARPA), 25-26; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 February 1956) SECRET. The former speculates based on interviews with POWs and defectors, but reaches conclusions similar to those of the latter. A like 1954 estimate by the U.S. Army Attache, Saigon, is included in Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 October 1954), 6.

69. Fall, Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 302.

70. Some 1,000 Chinese advisers entered North Vietnam; hundreds of Vietnamese were trained in China; and a steadily increasing stream of war material, variously estimated at 400 to 4,000 tons per month, flowed south from China: Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1954" (NIE-91, June 4, 1953) SECRET; Memorandum, OSD, Robert H. B. Wade to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel, April 13, 1954 (SECRET). J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946-1954," (Santa Monica: RAND, R4-4618-PR, May 1967), passim.

71. Hammer, op. cit., 331-337.

72. NIS 43C, 32-35.

73. Cf., Anita Lauve, Troika on Trial (MS Study for OSD/ISA, ARPA Contract, 1967), 428; and P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33.
74. Zesloff, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 44-53, 159-160; U.S. Dept of State, INR, "North Viet Nam Braces Itself for Socialism" (Oct 13, 1958), op. cit.
75. Defense Intelligence Agency, Annual Review of Demographic and Government Control Composition (U) (AP-1-460-3-5-65-INT, 1 January 1965), 41; NIS 43C, 38, 56, 59.
76. Ibid., 59.
77. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.
78. Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956," (National Intelligence Estimate 63.1-55, 19 July 1955), 7; CIA, SC09206 of 19 May 1954: the same report holds the Viet Minh disappointed in the Chinese People's Republic for lack of support, and well aware of Soviet distaste for an Asian involvement. Cf., Hammer, op. cit., 320-21.
79. Ibid., 346; also 342-344; cf., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 276-277; and P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, 30-32.
80. For summaries of the windings of French policy in this period see: Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (14 October 1954, 11 November 1954, 16 December 1954, 20 January 1955, and 5 May 1955, respectively); also, NIE 63.1-55, op. cit., 9-10.
81. Zagoria, op. cit., 27, 40-41, 100-102.
82. Ibid., Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1965), 271-273, 417-448.
83. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 30; Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council Briefing for 12 July 1955; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 July 1955); B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 181-184.
84. Phillipe Devillers, in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 32-33; Zagoria, op. cit., 42, 101-102.
85. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 43-58.
86. Zagoria, op. cit., 19-20.
87. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 298-299.

88. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 176; Central Intelligence Agency, "The Prospects for North Vietnam" (National Intelligence Estimate 63.2-57, 14 May 1957), 6.
89. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 August 1956).
90. CIA, Memorandum for the Record, 8 February 1957; Murti, op. cit., 176-177; John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam," American Journal of International Law, (Vol 61, No. 1, January 1967), 3, n. 7; Devillers, in Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33.
91. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 6-7, 52-62; Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 77-79; Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam," The China Quarterly (No. 9, January-March, 1962), 17; U.S. Department of State, "North Vietnam Braces Itself for Socialism" (Intelligence Report No. 7837, Oct. 13, 1958), 6-7.
92. U.S. Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The North Vietnamese Role...", op. cit., 11-12, 24-28.
93. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.
94. SNIE 14.3-63, op. cit., 4-5.
95. Robert A. Rupen and Robert Farrell, eds., Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1967), 52.
96. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 17-19.
97. Hoang, op. cit., 13. The French administered two provinces of Laos from Hanoi (Kiang Quang and Sam Neua), RAND Corporation, "DRV Relations with Laos and the Pathet Lao, 1954-1962" (Attachment (2) to I-14982, 11 August 1967).
98. Ibid.
99. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role...", op. cit., Vol II, Item 2; P. J. Honey, "The Foreign Policy of North Vietnam," Remarks prepared for the Asia Society and Association for Asian Studies Conference, May 14-15, 1965, pp.12-14.
100. Ibid., 12-14, 18-19.
101. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role...", loc. cit.
102. NIS 430, op. cit., 33.

103. Cf. Tab 1, pp. 43-44, n. 71, Chester L. Cooper, "The Complexities of Negotiation," Foreign Affairs, (Vol. 46, No. 3, April 1968), 465; Ltr, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach to Congressman Evans, op. cit.
104. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Factbook on the War in South Vietnam, V.; Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 4, 10-11.
105. DIA Fact Book, July, 1967, A-127.
106. Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 169-183.
107. Katzenbach-Evans Letter, op. cit., quoting the interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong Signal Platoon leader.
108. RM 4703, op. cit., 31.
109. DIA AP-4 (May, 1967), op. cit. This study was designed to answer queries from Congressman Evans (f. Katzenbach Letter), and was considered for publication, modified, as a "White Paper."
110. Interrogation of a Montagnard originally from Quang Tri Province, infiltrated into South Vietnam in October, 1961. DIA, "Role," 69-70; Katzenbach letter.
111. Interrogation of a member of one of the "special border-crossing teams." DIA, "Role," 70.
112. Ibid., 71. Interrogation of two members of the 603d Battalion.
113. Ibid., 71, 72. Interrogation of Senior Sergeant of VC 5th Military Region (Zone V) captured in Quang Ngai.
114. Ibid., 73. Interrogation of several agents captured in June and July, 1961; Interrogation of a member of a VC communications cadre.
115. Ibid., Interrogation of a 1962 infiltrator.
116. Ibid., Interrogation of several former NVA officers who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of officer of "1st VC Regiment," who defected in April 1963.
117. Carver, op. cit., 360.
118. DIA, "Role...", op. cit., ; Katzenbach letter.
119. Ibid.
120. Devillers, loc. cit., and New Facts Phu Loi Mass Murder, op. cit., flyleaf.
121. Ibid., 15-16.



122. Carver, op. cit., 358; Zagoria, op. cit., 160-161.
123. Zasloff, RM 4703, 73.
124. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.
125. NIS 43C, op. cit., 30.
126. DIA, "Role . . .," op. cit., 10-11; CIA, Biographic Data.
127. Ibid., 11-14. E.g. a Viet Minh cadre who surrendered in March, 1956, reported Le Duan's disgust with the ICC and with DRV policy toward it; a document taken from a VC cadre in November, 1956, quoting Le Duan. Cf. CIA, FVS-1071, of 21 September 1956, and CS-82270 of 16 January 1956.
128. Cf., Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 52-58.
129. Carver, op. cit., 359-360.
130. DIA, "Role . . .," 14-15.
131. Ibid., 28-29.
132. Carver, op. cit., 369-370. One prisoner attended an infiltration course at Son Tay in January, 1960, with a group of 60, and infiltrated with the same group in March, 1960. All 60 were officers or NCO's. One became a company commander of a VC unit in Quang Ngai; another a political officer of a battalion in the same province; another a deputy commander of the same battalion. DIA, "Role . . .," 77.
133. Ibid., 61-62.
134. This judgment is based on interrogations of 19 Vietnamese officers and senior NCO's who infiltrated in the years 1959-1963, and of NVA officers who surrendered in 1963. Under Secretary Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 19.
135. DIA, "Role . . .," 62-64.
136. Ibid., 4-8.
137. Ibid., 9-13; Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 185-199.
138. Captured document identified as a Lao Dong Party official paper, entitled "Decision to Create the Central Office for South Viet-Nam," cited in Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 6, DIA, "Role . . .," 11-13.

139. Ibid., 9-10.

140. Zasloff, RM 4703-ISA/ARPA, 25-37. A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary: according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

- "(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General [Central?] Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.
- "(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.
- "(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup . . . They were afraid . . ."

Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ In the RAND Study, the regroupees were asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?" The following responses were typical: d/

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.

(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PW) [Our political officer] explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

- a/ RM 4703, 27, 35.
  - b/ Ibid., 34.
  - c/ Ibid., 35.
  - d/ Ibid., 36.
- 141. DIA, "Role . . .," 50-53; CIA, " . . . Evidence of North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam Since 1955" (SC No. 2955/64, 10 March 1964), Section I.
  - 142. DIA, "Role . . .," 20-26; CIA, "Evidence. . ." (SC No 2955/64), loc. cit.
  - 143. Cf., Pike, op. cit., 31-56, 74-84.
  - 144. DIA, "Role . . .," 47-48.
  - 145. Ibid., 49-50.
  - 146. Ibid., 46-47.
  - 147. U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ST-67-023, 29 April 1967).
  - 148. Carver, op. cit., 363-364.
  - 149. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 July 1955, mentions the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi's hint that violent action would ensue were consultations delayed, but there was little other indication of Soviet intention to act.

150. CIA, CIWR, 27 October 1955.
151. CIA, CIWR, 22 September 1955.
152. CIA, CIWR, 10 November 1955.
153. U.S. Department of State, Soviet World Outlook (Publication 6836, July 1959), 98.
154. Ho on Revolution, (Signet) op. cit., 269-270; cf., Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review ( 10 May 1956).
155. Ibid., and CIA NSC Briefing for 2 July 1956. The difference in the two texts is readily explained in that Fall used the version of the speech published in the presumably edited four-volume edition of The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, 1961, 1962); see Fall, Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (Signet edition), page x.
156. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 274.
157. CIA, NSC Briefs of 2 July 1956 and 10 July 1956.
158. CIA, CIWR, 2 August 1956.
159. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 277.
160. Ibid., 279; Devillers, "The Struggle for Unification," op. cit., 10-11.
161. CIA, Memo for Record of 8 February 1957.
162. CIA, Singapore CS-82270 of 16 January 1956, and FVS-1071 of 21 September 1956; DIA, "Role . . .", 23-29. For further evidence of impatience and diminished faith in the South see CIA, Saigon CS-3,311,416 of April 1957.
163. Ibid.
164. The sequence of events concerning this UN action went as follows:
  - 23 Jan 1957 U.S. and 12 other UN members (in a resolution) call upon the UN Security Council to recommend South Vietnam and South Korea for membership in the UN.
  - 24 Jan 1957 Soviet delegate in UN Security Council, Arkady A. Sobolev, proposes that North Vietnam and North Korea, as well as South Vietnam and South Korea, be recommended for membership in the UN, as a "package deal."

- 30 Jan 1957 UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee endorses a resolution (backed by the U.S. and 12 other nations) calling for UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea. On the same day, the Committee declines to endorse a "package deal" proposed by the Soviet Union for simultaneous admission of North Vietnam and North Korea.
- 28 Feb 1957 UN General Assembly recommends to the Security Council UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea (40 to 8 with 18 abstentions, and 40 to 8 with 16 abstentions respectively).
- 9 Sep 1957 After making an unsuccessful attempt to postpone consideration of the question until Vietnam had been unified, the USSR vetoed the admission of the RVN to the UN.
- 25 Oct 1957 UN General Assembly (by votes 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions) passes resolution declaring that South Vietnam is eligible for membership in the UN. The resolution "noted 'with regret' the continued inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of /South Korea and South Vietnam/ . . . to the UN because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union." (Asian Recorder, New Delhi, Vol. 111, No. 51.)

Sources: U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," (Historical Studies Division, Hist. Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Research Project No. 747, November 1965; also, "Deadline Data on World Affairs," entries for "North Vietnam" and "South Vietnam," dates listed.

165. Ibid., and U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam" (1950-1965); Warner, op. cit., 131-132.
166. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 50.
167. Ibid., 50-51.
168. U.S. Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," op. cit.
169. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 51-62.
170. N.S. Khrushchev, "40 Years of Great October Socialist Revolution," Pravda (November 22, 1957), translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (IX, No. 14, 1 Jan 1958), 13-18.

171. Ibid., 3-7. For examples of the subsequent import attached to the Declaration of 1957, cf., "The Statement of Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Vol XII, No. 48, 28 Dec 1960, and No. 49, 4 Jan 1961), No. 49, p. 6, which refers to the "1957 Declaration" and quotes the cited text verbatim; also Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, "Nhan Dan Views Moscow, Party Statements" (13 January 1961, p. EE 9 ff.), which relates the proceedings of the Lao Dong's Third Party Congress (September, 1960) to the 1960 Moscow Conference, and to the "declaration of 1957."
172. Quoted in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit.
173. E.g. Bernard B. Fall, "Power and Pressure Groups in North Vietnam," China Quarterly (No. 9, January-March 1961), 38-39; P. J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh," ibid., 32-34.
174. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 59.
175. Ibid., 61-62.
176. Zagoria, op. cit., 102-103.
177. Cooper, et al., Case Studies in Insurgency . . . , op. cit., 77-80.
178. Ibid.
179. Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 200-201.
180. Fall, "Two Viet-Nams," op. cit., 63, 66-71; U.S. Department of State, Political Alliance of Vietnamese Nationalists, (Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949), 66-67, quoting the Factual Record of the August Revolution (Hanoi, September, 1946).
181. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.; Modelski, op. cit., 202-203.
182. Ibid., 207-210.
183. CIA, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam," Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, 26 September 1966; CIA, memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives . . . ," dated 7 September 1965; CIA, " . . . Evidence of North Vietnamese Violation of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam," op. cit., Section I, II.
184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.; CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 16 April 1958.
186. CIA, " . . . Evidence of North Vietnamese . . . , " op. cit.
187. CIA, NIS 43-C, op. cit., 35-36.
188. Ibid., 43-56.
189. U.S. Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," op. cit.
190. Ibid.
191. Quotations of Lao Dong leaders are from the English language broadcasts of the Vietnam News Agency, Radio Hanoi, as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, April 30 - May 15, 1959.
192. U.S. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace (White Paper, 1961), op. cit., II, 3.
193. U.S. Department of State, Saigon Despatch 278 to State, March 7, 1960, 1-6.
194. Ibid., 7.
195. Ibid.
196. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Prospects for North Vietnam," (National Intelligence Estimate 63.2-57, 14 May 1957); CIA, "Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort," (Special National Intelligence Estimate, 26 January 1967).
197. NIS 43C, op. cit., 33. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 168-181; Central Intelligence Agency, "North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Laos," (SC No. 02988/64, 20 April 1964), TOP SECRET, and CIA, same subject (SC 03026/64, 19 May 1964), TOP SECRET.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid., 3, Appendices II & III. "Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, 2d Revised Edition, March 1966), 102-107; CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations...", op. cit.

Following a rupture between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao and the assassination of the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of the RLG in April 1963, the DRV apparently determined to reinforce the Pathet

Lao, for the U.S. began to receive reports of renewed NVA operations in Laos from multiple sources, including a Pathet Lao defector and a Polish ICC member. By mid-1963, NVA strength was over 10 battalions, with some 5000 to 7000 men plus 3,000 advisers, and new arms and supplies were arriving constantly. For example, members of the Polish ICC team in Hanoi, told their counterparts in Laos in August 1963 that the DRV was dispatching daily shipments of military equipment into Laos, a/ and in February 1964 a Pathet Lao officer in southern Laos stated that the DRV was shipping in new and heavier arms, including tanks. b/

a/ Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/TDCSDB 3657725, 4 November 1963, cited in "North Vietnamese Violations...."

b/ CIA/TDCS 3572046 of 4 February 1964, in *ibid.*

201. Central Intelligence Agency, "Sihanouk's Cambodia" (National Intelligence Estimate 57-66, 6 October 1966), para. 23-27; CIA, MIS 43C, *op. cit.*, SNIE 57-67, *op. cit.*; U.S. Department of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," *op. cit.*
202. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, *op. cit.*, 399-401.
203. U.S. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace, *op. cit.*, II, 2-3.
204. Ibid., 3.
205. Ibid., 3-5.
206. "Statement of Conference of World Communist Parties - II," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Vol. XII, No. 49, Jan. 4, 1961), 3-11.
207. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin (North Vietnam, January 13, 1961).
208. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 302-303.
209. E.g., Speech by Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation Dinner, Chicago, February 17, 1962 (Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Release No. 239-62).
210. Ibid., Schlesinger, loc. cit.; Modelski, *op. cit.*, 198, quotes Soviet News, London (January 21, 1961, 43-44.